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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed a Memorandum Decision in the 
above-entitled matter, case no. 940747-CA, on September 14, 1995. 
The Court ruled that the Appellant's arguments on appeal were 
meritless. However, the Court felt that the sanction of 
dismissal which was meted out by the district court was too harsh 
under the circumstances and reversed the court's dismissal 
calling it an abuse of discretion. See Appendix A, Memorandum 
Decision. 
Defendant Continental Banking Company respectfully requests 
that a rehearing of this matter would be beneficial in light of 
facts which were not considered by this Court which would 
demonstrate that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
and that its decision in dismissing the action may be properly 
upheld. Defendant Continental Baking Company and its counsel 
specifically represent and aver that this Petition for Rehearing 
is presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
Defendant believes rehearing will present the most efficient and 
efficacious resolution of this matter. 
II 
POINTS OF FACT AND LAW WHICH MERIT REHEARING 
1. Defendant Continental Banking Company raised an 
argument in the court below that Appellant further violated the 
court's discovery order by failing to give full and complete 
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answers to interrogatory requests and document production 
requests. This Court declined to reach the issue, stating that 
the argument was not presented to the trial court. See 
Memorandum Decision, at n. 2. 
2. The court failed to consider the fact that the sanction 
of dismissal was specifically known to Plaintiff as a consequence 
of his failure to respond to the court-ordered discovery. The 
facts also demonstrate a repeated and knowing failure to comply 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the court's 
specific order compelling discovery. 
Ill 
ARGUMENT 
L. APPELLEE RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE ADEQUACY OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DISCOVERY IN THE COURT BELOW 
WHICH THE COURT DECLINED TO ADDRESS AND SHOULD BE 
ADDRESSED ON REHEARING. 
In footnote 2 of the court's Memorandum Decision, this Court 
declined to address the alternative theory raised by Defendant 
that, in addition to being late, the Plaintiff's answers to 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents also 
violated the court's specific order because they were not full 
and complete answers justifying dismissal. See Appendix "A". 
The Court stated in footnote 2, "In addition, we do not reach 
appellee's argument that appellant further violated the court's 
discovery order by failing to give complete answers to the 
interrogatory requests. This argument was not presented to the 
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trial court, and we decline to reach it for the first time on 
appeal." See Memorandum Decision, fn. 2; Appendix "A", A review 
of the record on appeal demonstrates that the Defendant did in 
fact raise the issue with the trial court. In its Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Defendant made 
specific arguments addressing the fact that the answers to 
discovery, even if deemed timely, were nonresponsive and violated 
the court's order, warranting dismissal. See R. 379, 365, 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Relief from Judgment. See Appendix "B". The arguments set forth 
in that memorandum specifically address the fact that the court 
had required full and complete answers to the discovery by the 
court-imposed deadline. Id. The memorandum sets forth 
specifically that the answers were inadequate because they did 
not disclose any of the information which Plaintiff stated that 
he was ready to present at trial even though several months had 
passed. Instead, the answers to discovery merely indicated that 
information had been given to Plaintiff's experts and that 
Plaintiff was awaiting responses. Id. Therefore, if this Court 
would re-examine the record in this case, it would become 
apparent that the Defendant's argument on appeal in Section IV of 
the Brief merits consideration by the Court prior to conclusion 
of this matter in the Court of Appeals. 
IL. THE COURT, IN RECONSIDERING THIS MATTER, SHOULD ADDRESS 
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WITTINGLY VIOLATED A COURT 
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ORDER WHICH EXPRESSLY STATED THAT THE SANCTION OF 
DISMISSAL WOULD BE THE RESULT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY, 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court cited to cases such as 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1991), stating 
that the sanction of dismissal was improper absent multiple 
instances of abuse and repeated willful failure to respond to 
discovery. On reconsideration, the Court should examine the 
facts again with the understanding that Plaintiff had represented 
that it was ready to present new evidence and new expert theories 
on the eve of trial. As demonstrated in the record, trial was 
expressly continued so that discovery of the expert's opinion 
could be obtained from the Plaintiff. Request for production of 
documents and interrogatories were sent to Plaintiff four days 
after the trial was continued. 
Thereafter Plaintiff completely failed to answer the 
Defendant's requests, failed to reply to counsel's correspondence 
and failed to file any response to Defendant's motion to compel 
discovery. Plaintiff completely failed to provide the answers as 
ordered by the court, knowing that the court had ruled that 
dismissal would be the result of his failure to respond as 
indicated in the court's order compelling discovery. Therefore, 
Plaintiff acted multiple times and knowingly failed to respond by 
(1) failing to provide answers to discovery in any manner, (2) 
failing to respond to the motion to compel, (3) failing to 
respond to the court's order, and (4) failing to provide full and 
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complete answers as required by the court order when the 
Plaintiff did in fact provide answers. This is precisely the 
type of conduct which merits the censure of dismissal. See 
Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 
1368 Utah App. cert denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, this Court failed to distinguish with any 
discussion, the fact that the sanction of dismissal was known to 
Plaintiff and contained in the order compelling discovery served 
upon him. The record shows Plaintiff was well aware that his 
failure to comply with the discovery order would result in 
dismissal of his case. This is a far cry from reviewing a case 
where a judge imposes the sanction of dismissal for a discovery 
violation after the fact. In this case, Plaintiff's acts were a 
direct violation of an order which expressly stated that failure 
to comply would be met with the sanction of dismissal. On 
appeal, this Court fails to address these facts in its analysis 
and should be considered by the Court in determining whether or 
not the trial court abused its discretion. 
Appellee Continental Banking contends that once the district 
court makes an order, especially one which the Plaintiff knows 
the threatened sanction beforehand, the authority of the court to 
impose the sanction in managing its docket should be reviewed 
very deferentially under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Appellee believes that reconsideration of the facts relevant to 
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Plaintiff's knowledge that he would face the sanction of 
dismissal, mitigate the apparent harshness of the sanction. 
Defendant further contends that the Court did not explain or 
consider how the trial court abused its discretion but merely 
felt that under the circumstances its collective judgment would 
have been different. This Court does not address the specific 
facts of this case or set forth why, given the facts of this 
case, "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial 
court" necessary to find an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); see also State v. Larson, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Continental Banking asserts that a rehearing of 
this matter is warranted to address Defendant's alternative 
argument that Plaintiff's answers to the discovery, even if 
deemed timely, were also violative of the court order. 
Further, a review of the facts demonstrates that Plaintiff 
wittingly violated a court order, knowing that the consequence of 
the violation would be dismissal of the case. Re-examination of 
the facts will demonstrate that the Plaintiff's conduct in this 
matter was sufficiently repetitious, callous and egregious so 
that a reasonable court could have adopted the view taken by the 
trial court in this matter. Therefore, the Appellate Court 
should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
and should make Plaintiff's burden on appeal to demonstrate that 
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the court did in fact abuse its discretion and that no reasonable 
court could have taken the view adopted by the trial court. 
Defendant requests rehearing of this matter in order to clarify 
the Court's holding and ensure that all factors, both legal and 
factual, are considered by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this day of (-2Ji^\^J>L>^- 1995. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
PLANT 
BRADLEY R. HELSTEN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing motion by 
mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, 
postage prepaid, this j^Afday of <:^g^0V9 /^J^>-S>—- , 1995, to 
the following: 
DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR. 
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
William W. Morton 
10885 South State Street 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS 
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William W. Morton, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 940747-CA v. 
Continental Baking Company, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
F I L E D 
(September 14, 1995) 
Attorneys: Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Sandy, for Appellant 
Terry M. Plant and Bradley R. Helsten, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson. 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
William W. Morton appeals from the trial courts order 
dismissing with prejudice his personal injury action based upon 
failure to comply with a discovery order. We reverse and 
remand. 
We have reviewed each of the issues raised by appellant 
regarding excuses for noncompliance with the court's discovery 
order, or reasons for extension of the court imposed deadline, 
and have found them to be without merit. However, despite 
appellant's failure to timely comply with the trial court's 
order, we also note the well established proposition that 
dismissal "is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted 
out with caution." ^rfri*icrtonivl Wafref*ffif 2?P-2&/452, 456 (Utah 
App. 1991) ; SfegMAgOgUtah Deo't-of->Transtr.^v.^Oscfuthorpe^ 892 
C£*2~d?r4, 7 (UtafT*Y§^ 1ffi^  Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. 
Micro-dex Corp,, 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1987). Our 
1. We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
rc/iew of the cases affirming a ruling of dismissal with 
c -ajudice or a ruling of default ^ dgment: indicates that such 
a mon is :sually approvea in case. inv-»ving more egregious 
neglect ar.i misconduct: than is present . ; the case at hand. See 
Osguthoroe. 392 P.2d at 9 (affirming der^ult judgment because 
defendant "xhad multiple and repeated opportunities to assert his 
claims and positions and has flagrantly neglected to do so'") 
(citation omitted); tiarseh v. Collina,-* 684 P.2d 52, 54-55'*\utah 
1984) (affirming default judgment in light of defendant's 
repeated wilful failure to respond to discovery or to continue to 
participate in the case in any way) ; jg5f^a*?Mat.*»Insv Co*; v*» 
SchQ^lPerv^76S^P.2d 9SQ^^9£2.^tV3&^J®V>J^l3M$±t (affirming default 
judgment in view of defendant's failure to comply with discovery 
orders, multiple instances of intimidation of witnesses, bribery 
attempts, and other "aggravated misconduct"); Cftarlie-Brown» 
Cortstzxm'Go * > v. Leisure-Sports, Inc.^TJEQL P;24^ 1368 (Utah App.) 
(affirming dismissal with prejudice due to multiple instances of 
failure to appear at court hearings and failure to timely 
prosecute the case), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). We 
agree that appellant's conduct merited sanction and acknowledge 
the discretion given trial courts regarding the imposition of 
discovery sanctions. See Darrincrton, 812 P.2d at 457. We are 
constrained, however, to follow prior decisions approving 
dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 only under 
circumstances much more egregious than those in evidence here. 
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss the 
case with prejudice as an abuse of discretion and remand the 
matter for further proceedings. 
Further, due to appellant's utter failure to address the 
trial court's imposition of sanctions, including attorney fees, 
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arising from appellant's improper allegations of fraud, we 
dec^rlne to^ reach the issue.2 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregor Orme, Presiding Judge 
£&&£v*>t. 
Norman H. Jackson,Pffudge 
^cpy or i ~.^.v.sr»t on ,.ij ,;•« . ...i o^..«: or 
Appeals. :.i i~•: :ny whereof, 1 have *,GL my hand and 
affixed the s^alov (he Court. 
ilyi 
Clerk of )he7Court 
Jl- frw K 
By j . .fc S i -
Deputy Clerk 
Date 
<6W&r 
2. In addition, we do not reach appellee,s argument that 
appellant further violated the court's discovery order by failing 
to give complete answers to the interrogatory requests. This 
argument was not presented to the trial court, and we decline to 
reach it for the first time on appeal. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (general 
rule is to decline consideration of issues raised for first time 
on appeal). 
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TabB 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM W. MORTON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
| DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM | IN OPPOSITION TO | PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR | RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
| Civil No. 910400454PI 
I Judge Ray M. Harding 
The defendant, Continental Baking Company, submits the 
following memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief' 
from Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. As stated by Plaintiff in his Motion for Relief from 
Judgment, this matter has been set for trial on two different 
occasions and was continued initially due to medical problems being 
experienced by the plaintiff. 
2. This matter was again set for trial on January 11, 
1994. On January 10, 1994, Defendant's counsel received a call 
from Plaintiff's counsel with Mr. Phil Hoyt, Plaintiff's expert 
witness, present on the telephone line explaining to Defendant's 
counsel that Plaintiff would be offering new evidence through 
Mr. Hoyt and a new theory of liability against the Defendant. In 
response, Defendant's counsel instructed Plaintiff's counsel that 
new evidence at that late hour was unacceptable, and a telephone 
conference was initiated with the Court. After discussing this 
matter with the Court, it was decided that in order that Plaintiff 
be given the opportunity to present this evidence fairly, the trial 
date be continued and was, in fact, continued until August 1994. 
It is important to remember and particularly relevant to 
Plaintiff's motion for relief that the reason the trial date was 
continued was because of new evidence that was going to be 
introduced through Plaintiff's expert, Phil Hoyt. Further, that 
evidence was represented to be prepared and ready to be presented 
at the January 11, 1994 trial. 
3. Four days later, on January 14, Defendant served 
upon Plaintiff's counsel various interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents which in large part sought to obtain the 
new evidence that Plaintiff was ready to utilize at trial and which 
was the reason the trial date was continued. Other information was 
requested; however, the purpose of these interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents was to give the Defendant the 
information that formed the basis for continuing the trial. (See 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents which were 
attached to Defendant's Motion to Compel filed June 16, 1994.) 
4. After receiving no responses to the interrogatories 
or requests for production of documents, on February 25, 1994, 
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approximately 10 days after the answers to interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents were due, Defendant's counsel 
wrote a letter (a copy of which is attached hereto as "Exhibit A") , 
explaining to Plaintiff's counsel the need to receive an immediate 
response to the discovery requests and an explanation that if 
responses were not received on or before March 10, a motion to 
compel would be filed. The letter then goes on to indicate that 
before any depositions would be taken in this matter, it was 
necessary that answers to interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents be received* After receiving no response 
to the interrogatories or requests, on March 16, 1994, the 
Defendant filed its Motion to Compel, 6 days beyond the time that 
was set forth in the letter of February 25, 1994. 
5. Having received no word whatsoever from the 
Plaintiff or responses to the outstanding discovery requests, onv 
March 29, thirteen days after the Motion to Compel was filed, 
Defendant submitted to Plaintiff a Notice to Submit for Decision 
and a proposed Order which would have given Plaintiff up to April 8 
to provide answers to the interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents. This Notice to Submit for Decision and 
proposed Order were mailed to Plaintiff's counsel at 10885 South 
State Street, Sandy, Utah 84070, on March 29, 1994. (See 
Certificate of Mailing and attached Affidavit of Lynn Javadi.) 
Again, nothing was received from the plaintiff in response to the 
Notice to Submit for Decision. 
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6. On April 12, 1994, Defendant's counsel called the 
Clerk of the Court to inquire regarding the status of the Court's 
entry of the proposed Order submitted with the Notice to Submit for 
Decision. Defendant's counsel initially spoke with the Court's 
Clerk, Joe Morton, concerning the status of the Order and later 
that same day received a telephone call from Mr. Morton, wherein he 
explained that the Court would not sign the Order submitted with 
the Notice to Submit for Decision, but rather requested that 
counsel prepare a new Order giving the Plaintiff 10 days from that 
date to respond to the discovery and upon failure to do so, the 
Order was to include specific language that the matter would be 
dismissed with prejudice. (See Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees, dated April 12, 1994.) 
7. On April 12, 1994, the Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees was entered by the 
Court, which by its own terms made all responses to the discovery 
requests due on or before April 22 at 5:00 o'clock p.m. (10 days 
after the signing of the Order) . In accordance with the 
Certificate of Mailing signed by Bryan Hale of Defendant's 
attorney's office, a copy of the Order was mailed to Plaintiff's 
counsel in the same manner that Defendant's counsel has always 
dealt with Plaintiff's counsel in providing him documents. It is 
interesting to note that Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receipt 
of the Motion to Compel which was served upon him in this same 
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manner. (See Affidavits of Bryan Hale and Lynn Javadi attached 
hereto.) 
8. As of April 22, 1994 at 5:05 p.m., no responses to 
the outstanding discovery requests had been received, nor had there 
been any communication from Plaintiff's counsel whatsoever 
concerning those discovery requests. (See Affidavit of Terry M. 
Plant dated April 22, 1994, previously submitted with motion for 
order of dismissal.) 
9. On the next business day, which was April 25, 1994, 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Order 
Compelling Discovery was hand delivered to the Court by Mr. John N. 
Braithwaite, an attorney at defense counsel's law firm. 
Mr. Braithwaite also personally hand delivered a copy of the 
motion, memorandum in support of motion to dismiss, order of 
dismissal and letter to the Court to the office of Plaintiff's 
counsel on that same day. (See Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite, 
attached hereto.) 
10. Included with the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Comply with Order Compelling Discovery and supporting memorandum, 
which documents were hand delivered to Plaintiff's counsel's law 
firm by Mr. Braithwaite, was a copy of the Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees attached to 
the memorandum as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Affidavit of Terry 
M. Plant, setting forth the fact that no responses to the discovery 
requests had been received at the time the matter was submitted to 
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the Court. The hand deliveries were made to Plaintiff's counsel's 
office. (See Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite.) 
11. On April 25, 1994, at approximately 2:15 p.m., 
Defendant's counsel received, by means of facsimile, answers to 
interrogatories and responses to requests for production of 
documents. A copy of those answers received on April 25, 1994 are 
attached hereto as "Exhibit B." 
12. The Order of the Court dated April 12, 1994 not only 
required that the answers be received by April 22 at 5:00 o'clock 
p.m., but also required that "full and complete responses" to the 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents be 
received. The Court is directed to the responses to the 
interrogatories and particularly answers to Interrogatories Nos. 8, 
.9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. Plaintiff's counsel essentially states 
that the interrogatories had been provided to his various witnesses 
and that on some unknown day in the future the interrogatories 
would be answered when his experts saw fit to provide him with the 
information. Further, the interrogatories talk about future site 
visits which will be made by Mr. Phil Hoyt, Plaintiff's expert, and 
which will require that the interrogatories be supplemented. 
13* As to the request for production of documents, 
Answer No. 2 refers to photocopies of pictures that were being 
produced. No such pictures were attached. Answer no. 3 makes 
reference to notes, calculations and writings of various experts 
and the response is given that these notes have already been 
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provided as to Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Remington, in spite of the fact 
that Mr. Hoyt apparently is changing his testimony, and that they 
will be provided regarding Greg Duval, but were not at the time the 
responses were given. In response to Request No. 4, Plaintiff 
objects to the information requested without providing any 
information. Requests Nos. 5 and 6 are both answered by "See 
accompanying documents." No documents of any kind accompanied the 
faxed responses. 
14. On or about May 5, 1994, after not hearing from the 
Court concerning this matter and having heard nothing from 
Plaintiff's counsel, counsel for the Defendant called the Court to 
inquire concerning whether the Order dismissing Plaintiff's case 
had been entered. It was then that Defendant's counsel was 
informed by the Clerk of the Court that the Order of the Court had 
been signed on April 28, 1994. On May 6, 1994, Defendant's counsel 
personally traveled to the Court to inspect the Court's file to 
make certain that all certificates of service pertaining to the 
various notices and motions at issue here were properly contained 
in the file. Every document sent to the Court concerning the 
issues raised by Defendant's Motion to Compel contained a 
certificate of mailing and/or hand delivery. (See Court file.) 
15. On May 6, 1994, in accordance with Rule 58(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a Notice of Signing of Judgment was 
sent to Plaintiff's counsel. Again, the same certificate of 
delivery was signed as had been signed in all other mailings and 
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deliveries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receipt 
of this pleading, which was delivered in the same manner as the 
various other pleadings. (See Affidavit of Denver Snuffer, H 10.) 
16. On May 10, 1994, the Defendant received the enclosed 
Certificate of Delivery, Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Production of Documents ("Exhibit C"). 
The Court will note that the answers to the interrogatories are 
identical to those provided in the earlier facsimile on April 25 
and that, for the first time on May 10, 1994, Plaintiff provided 
responses to requests for production of documents. However, those 
responses only include an Affidavit of Stan Holyoak, a statement of 
Gale Pike, a statement of Marvin Ainge, and some photocopies of 
photographs. No responses have been received in response to 
Requests Nos. 3 or 4, and as admitted in Plaintiff's own 
memorandum, all statements responsive to Requests Nos. 4 and 5 have-
not been provided. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO TIMELY RESPOND TO 
DISCOVERY AND HIS "EXCUSES" DO NOT RISE TO THE 
LEVEL OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. THE PERTINENT 
DOCUMENTS WERE ALL SERVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WERE HAND 
DELIVERED, EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDING A CLAIM THAT 
THE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT RECEIVED. 
A. All relevant documents were received by 
Plaintiff's counsel. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Plaintiff's 
attempt to avoid the various court orders is based upon an 
assertion that Plaintiff's counsel did not properly receive various 
pleadings. In other words, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting 
to explain his "excusable neglect" by alleging that the Defendant 
failed to provide proper notice of the various pleadings and other 
documents which have been submitted. Not only is such an approach 
offensive in that it attempts to cast the blame away from where it 
belongs, which is squarely on the shoulders of Plaintiff's counsel, 
but it is totally unfounded given the certificates of service and 
the supporting affidavits from various members of Defendant's 
counsel's office, including Mr. John Braithwaite, a partner in the 
firm of Hanson, Epperson & Smith, who has prepared an affidavit 
indicating that the crucial documents were served personally by 
means of hand delivery, as well as Lynn Javadi and Bryan Hale, 
other members of Defendant's attorney's law firm. These affidavits 
and certificates of service conclusively establish that all 
relevant documents were served upon Plaintiff in accordance with 
Rule 5(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Apparently, 
Plaintiff's counsel does not have a system within his office to 
ensure that he receives documents mailed or delivered to him. If 
so, it certainly cannot be "excusable neglect" when he does not 
receive those documents. 
Further, it appears to be Plaintiff's position that 
somehow he received certain documents, i.e., the Motion to Compel 
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and the Notice of Signing of Judgment, and yet, for some reason, he 
did not receive the Notice to Submit for Decision, together with 
the proposed Order, the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel 
and Awarding Attorney Fees, the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Comply with Order, together with its supporting memorandum and the 
Order of Dismissal itself, as well as the cover letter dated 
April 25, 1994, which was hand delivered to the Court and to 
Plaintiff's counsel. All of these documents were either hand 
delivered or properly mailed. Plaintiff's counsel offers no 
explanation as to why he received some of the papers and not 
others, in spite of the fact that service was properly made on all 
documents. 
Rule 5(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically outlines the proper means of service of pleadings and 
papers such as those involved in this matter on a party. That rule 
specifically provides for service by mailing the papers to 
Plaintiff's counsel at his known address or by leaving the papers 
at the attorney's office with his clerk or other person in charge 
thereof. Both means of service have been utilized in this case to 
make certain that Plaintiff's counsel had notice of the proceedings 
concerning the Motion to Compel and orders relating thereto. Every 
communication with the Court was served upon the Plaintiff in 
accordance with Rule 5, and to ensure that Plaintiff's counsel 
obtained these documents, the Motion to Dismiss, together with the 
Order of Dismissal, was hand delivered by an attorney to the office 
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of Plaintiff's counsel. The Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Compel and Awarding Attorney Fees was attached as "Exhibit AM to 
the papers that were hand delivered with the motion to dismiss on 
April 25, 1994. Defendant's counsel does not know what he could 
have done beyond what was done in this case to properly ensure that 
Plaintiff received notice of the proceedings. 
B. Given Plaintiff's counsel's notice of the 
pending Motion to Compel and overdue 
responses, his actions do not rise to the 
level of "excusable neglect." 
In his Motion for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiff's 
counsel acknowledges receipt of the Motion to Compel, which was 
sent by mail on March 16, 1994. (See Affidavit of Denver Snuffer, 
H 7.) From that day forward, Plaintiff's counsel did nothing to 
respond to the motion. Rather, according to his own affidavit he 
waited an additional 40 days and then faxed incomplete responses to 
Defendant's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel then did nothing further, 
in spite of the fact that on April 25, 1994 the Motion to Dismiss 
for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Discovery and the Order 
of Dismissal were hand delivered to Plaintiff's attorney's office. 
Plaintiff then claims his next notice was the Notice of Signing of 
Judgment, which was served upon the Plaintiff in a manner identical 
to the way the other pleadings had been sent to him. 
Amazingly, Plaintiff comes before this Court seeking 
relief from the judgment based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect. Even if Plaintiff's assertions that he did 
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not receive the various papers were taken at face value, it cannot 
be excusable neglect for a party to be aware that answers to 
interrogatories are outstanding, that the opposing counsel has sent 
him a letter demanding answers to the discovery requests, and most 
importantly, that a motion to compel has been filed and in spite of 
all those things, do nothing. Here, Plaintiff's counsel made no 
attempt to contact Defendant's counsel to seek an extension or to 
provide any explanation as to why the answers were not provided to 
Defendant's counsel. Instead, he chose to ignore the motion to 
compel and now attempts to rely upon his contention that he did not 
receive the intervening papers. The fact is, his office did 
receive those intervening pleadings, which has been established 
irrefutably by affidavits submitted with this memorandum. If, in 
fact, he did not get those documents, the only plausible 
explanation is because of problems within the plaintiff's 
attorney's own office, which falls well short of the mark in 
establishing excusable neglect, especially in light of Plaintiff's 
knowledge of the ongoing demands to respond to the outstanding 
discovery requests and the actual filing of the motion to compel. 
The Utah appellate courts have provided guidance in 
assessing whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), 
given the circumstances presented. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (1984), has stated that it 
is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a 
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movant has shown sufficient cause to obtain relief from judgment. 
In that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
A trial court has discretion in determining 
whether a movant has shown "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" 
and this Court will reverse the trial court's 
rulings only when there has been abuse of 
discretion. 
684 P.2d at 54. 
The plaintiff also attempts to argue the merits of his 
case, explaining to the Court the great injustice that will be done 
to his client due to the injuries sustained by his client in the 
accident in question. The defendant has vigorously disputed the 
plaintiff's claims and contends that the complaint is without 
merit. It is not appropriate, however, under Rule 60(b) to examine 
the merits of the claim. Id. at 55. In other words, the court in 
Larson indicated that the merits and/or the substance of a case is 
irrelevant to Rule 60(b) relief. Rather, it needs to be 
established that proper grounds have been shown under Rule 60(b) 
for relief from judgment to be granted. Here, no such grounds 
exist. 
The cases which address this issue do not provide a 
definitive formula for the determination of excusable neglect. It 
must be examined on a case-by-case basis, greatly relying upon the 
discretion of the trial court, who has had dealings with the case 
and who knows the specifics of the case. See, State ex rel. Utah 
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State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983). 
Here, Plaintiff's counsel knew that the trial date was 
continued because of a controversy regarding his expert witnesses 
and knew or reasonably should have known that the discovery at 
issue in large part went to that new evidence. He received the 
interrogatories, a letter from Defendant's counsel, and the motion 
to compel, and in spite of that did nothing to obtain an extension 
of time to answer, either by requesting such an extension from 
Defendant's counsel or by seeking an extension as would be allowed 
under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He then 
attempts to shift the blame for doing nothing by maintaining to 
this Court that he did not receive copies of the Notice to Submit 
for Decision, the Motion to Dismiss, supporting memorandum or Order 
of Dismissal. Even if counsel did not receive certain of the 
papers, doing nothing under the above-stated circumstances is not 
"excusable." Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Comply with Order Compelling Discovery, the memorandum in support 
thereof, the Order of Dismissal and the cover letter to Judge 
Harding were, in fact, hand delivered to the office of Plaintiff's 
counsel. While it is possible that one of several mailings could 
have inexplicably become lost in the mail, it is impossible that 
all of these documents were lost, particularly since the latter 
documents were delivered by hand by an attorney from Defendant's 
counsel's office. Therefore, the fault for Plaintiff's counsel not 
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receiving these documents must lie on him and cannot reasonably be 
shifted to the defendant, as is attempted by Plaintiff's counsel. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF STILL HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE 
COURT'S ORDER TO "DELIVER TO DEFENDANT FULL 
AND COMPLETE RESPONSES" TO THE OUTSTANDING 
DISCOVERY. THIS CONTINUED FAILURE TO COMPLY 
WITH THE ORDER SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED. 
Perhaps the most upsetting aspect of this case is that 
Plaintiff still has not provided full and complete responses to the 
outstanding discovery, in direct contravention of the Court's Order 
of April 12, 1994. As set forth in the Statement of Facts hereto, 
the basis for the continuance of the trial in January 1994 was new 
testimony which was going to be propounded by Plaintiff's expert, 
Phil Hoyt, and possibly others. It is now four months later and 
the information has not been divulged. If it was to be presented 
at trial on January 11, there is absolutely no excuse for a failure 
to provide the information immediately in response to the discovery 
requests and even more inexcusable that the information has still 
not been divulged. The Court's attention is directed to 
Interrogatories No. 8 and 9, which specifically request information 
concerning different testimony than that identified in depositions 
seasonably taken of Plaintiff's experts Remington and Hoyt. 
Instead of providing the information sought concerning that new 
testimony, Plaintiff simply states as follows concerning 
Remington's testimony: 
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This answer requires direct information from 
the expert as to what his testimony will be. 
We will supplement this answer when Mr. 
Remington provides us answer. He is being 
provided with these answers to interrogatories 
and also with an accompanying production of 
documents and asked to provide an answer to 
this interrogatory. 
In response to the same question concerning Mr. Hoyt, the 
answer is given as follows: 
Just as Don Remington is being provided these 
answers and asked to respond to the preceding 
question, Dr. Hoyt will also be given these 
answers and asked to answer this question. 
When the answer is received, it will be 
forwarded to you. 
A similar answer is given for Mr. Greg Duval, another 
expert anticipated to be called, in answer to Interrogatory No. 10. 
In addition, Plaintiff responded to Interrogatories Nos. 13 and 14 
by stating that "it is anticipated that at some point Mr. Hoyt will 
go to the scene and that the findings of his site visit will be 
provided." 
In other words, the very evidence which was primarily 
responsible for the continuance of the trial and which became the 
center of the focus of the interrogatories at issue, has still not 
been provided. Plaintiffs counsel apparently thinks that because 
he has filed something, he is in compliance with the Court's Order. 
The Court's Order required full and complete responses. To this 
date, the Plaintiff has still failed to comply and provide the 
information. Plaintiffs counsel has had the interrogatories since 
January 14, 1994. In May of 1994, he is still telling the Court 
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that he will at some point submit these answers to interrogatories 
and provide us the information requested from his experts* Under 
the circumstances of this case, considering the reason the trial in 
this case was continued, such an approach is simply untenable and 
should be offensive to the Court. The Plaintiff remains in 
violation of the Court's order. This continued violation of the 
order defeats any claim of excusable neglect or any other reason 
for relief under Rule 60(b) and further warrants dismissal at this 
point even assuming some failure of Plaintiff's counsel to receive 
certain papers. 
Mr. Snuffer goes through detailed apologies and attempted 
explanations as to why he did not respond to the discovery. 
Nowhere, however, does he explain to the Court why he still has not 
seen fit to provide the specific information concerning experts and 
the documents concerning that same testimony. Rather, he simply-
launches into a long discourse concerning the nature of the 
Plaintiff's injuries and the work that his firm has done on the 
case, and forgets to address the issues at hand. As previously 
stated, the case of Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), 
makes consideration of the merits of the case inappropriate when 
seeking relief from judgment. 
In summary, even should the Court somehow believe that 
Plaintiffs counsel did not have proper notice of the Court's Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel and the Motion to Dismiss, 
Mr. Snuffer cannot explain why he has still failed to respond to 
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the outstanding discovery. Under these circumstances, the failure 
to respond simply cannot be excusable neglect. The information 
requested in discovery was the very information that the Plaintiff 
was prepared to present at trial within a day or two of January 10, 
when the Court ordered the trial beginning January 11 continued. 
Plaintiff's counsel has simply disregarded the motion to compel and 
ignored the Order of the Court and still continues to be in 
noncompliance with that Order. Under these circumstances and for 
the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment should be denied and the Order of April 28, 1994 
dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims for relief, should be upheld. 
DATED this day of May, 1994. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TEBRWHJ PEANT 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
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